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NGOs, politics, and participation: 
A critical case study of the foreign funded NGO sector and its capacity to empower local 
communities 
 
 
 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often employ the rhetoric of local empowerment 
through ‘participatory’ programming. A critical analysis of such programs, however, suggests 
that the capacity of NGOs to politically empower local communities is often misconstrued, 
especially since many of these programs overlook the ways in which foreign funding structures 
actually restrict local participation and limit local empowerment. This point is illustrated by a 
critical examination of studies claiming that the World Bank’s 1994 PLANAFLORO program in 
Rondônia, Brazil did politically mobilize local populations.  
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Introduction 
 At a time when nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in South America are facing 
political scrutiny from national leaders around the continent (Agencia de Noticias Fides [ANF], 
2009; Petras, 1997), issues of the NGO sector’s political influence on and accountability to civil 
society are growing topics of deliberation. Some scholars have suggested that foreign funded 
NGOs have an impact on local, state, and national politics, as well as improve civil society’s 
“access to economic resources, social benefits [and] ultimately the quality of democratic 
representation” (Brown, Brown, & Desposato, 2002, p. 1). Such assumptions perpetuate the 
thinking that:  
NGOs promote community organization [and] mobilization … they legitimate 
and strengthen civil society, generate more pluralism and political participation, 
offer a base for civil resistance to oppressive political systems [and] contribute to 
democracy by helping to create a more ‘vibrant and autonomous civil society’ that 
can challenge despotic government. (Boulding & Gibson, 2008, p. 483) 
Following this logic, a swell in NGO activity will thus result in increased opportunities for 
citizens to form the “horizontal linkages,” or bonds of trust, cooperation and interdependence 
within civil society, which contribute to democratic participation and mobilize citizens to 
participate in shaping their political environment (Brown et al., 2002; Seixas, 2010). Critics, 
however, argue that such claims overlook the real relations of political power inherent in the 
organizational structures and administrative processes of organizations like NGOs, especially 
those which are large in scale and receive foreign funding. These scholars argue that NGOs, as 
organizations, are held more accountable to the desires of international donors than civil society; 
that they function in a way that inherently impedes critical citizen participation; and that, 
ultimately, they encourage neo-liberal homogeneity rather than the local and autonomous self-
determination of development strategies (Ebrahim, 2003; Kamat, 2004; Wallace, Bornstein, & 
Chapman, 2007). While the debate between NGO and foreign aid influence on civil society and 
empowerment is one with substantial academic history, the topic is ever-pertinent as 
development institutions continue to channel aid money through NGOs and other civil society 
organizations (CSOs) at an increasing rate. Currently, for example, the World Bank partners with 
NGOs and civil society organizations in approximately 81% of its development projects, a 
significant jump from the 21% of projects which involved CSOs in 1990 (World Bank, 2011). In 
order to more fully understand the consequences of this growing NGO presence in development 
and civil society, the impact of past foreign funding efforts to support the NGO sector and the 
structural allocation of these funds should be more critically analyzed.  
 This paper examines the World Bank-funded Rondônia Natural Resource Management 
Project (Plano Agropecuário e Florestal de Rondônia, or PLANAFLORO), implemented in 
Brazil in the mid-1990s, as a case which can help further understanding of the relationship 
between NGOs, foreign funding, political participation, and empowerment within civil society. 
The PLANAFLORO case demonstrates how the growth of the NGO sector may have led to 
changes in political voting patterns, though perhaps not in the overall political structures, in spite 
of the project’s heavy emphasis on involving the local community via participatory 
programming. In viewing the case first through the lens of Putnam’s associational theory and 
secondly through a more critical perspectivei, the capacity of NGO participatory programs to 
empower civil society is called into question.  
 This paper begins with a brief history of the NGO sector in Brazil as it relates to the dawn 
of the PLANAFLORO initiative, followed, first, by an overview of the program itself and, 
second, by a summary of Brown, Brown, and Desposato’s (2002, 2007) interpretation of the 
PLANAFLORO program that is in line with associational activity theory. This synopsis will help 
to contextualize the prevailing viewpointii held by many academics and international 
organizations that NGOs do contribute to greater democratic participation and political change 
(World Bank, 2011), and that NGOs do indeed serve as “bridging organizations” between social 
groups as well as champions of civil society (see for example Vakil, 1997). Lastly, a critical 
view of PLANAFLORO’s use of participatory development practices is presented. This view, 
steeped in the values of critical pedagogy, suggests that the NGO sector actually has limited 
capacity to promote the agency of civil society without a concordant attempt to address deeper 
social structures of inequality through participatory means (Ebrahim, 2003; Freire, 1974). This 
perspective is perhaps best supported by the fact that today, despite heavy investment in the 
growth of the NGO sector under the PLANAFLORO project over a decade ago, the people of 
Amazonia continue to struggle for local political representation and control over the 
development processes that pervade their daily lives (Lemos & Roberts, 2008; Osava, 2010). By 
critically examining the PLANAFLORO initiative and studies surrounding its impact on civil 
society, researchers and the development community can gain better insight into the ways in 
which foreign funded NGOs and CSOs can actually impede the political empowerment of 
marginalized populations today, despite their intent to be participatory and to incorporate local 
communities. Ultimately, the paper argues that (1) foreign funded efforts to organize civil 
society face organizational constraints in implementing the kinds of participatory practices which 
stem from the theoretical camp of critical pedagogy (Cervero, 2006; Forester, 1989), and that (2) 
the real political impact of participatory, civil society-based development programs should be 
carefully critiqued and assessed based on their ability to influence local empowerment, not 
simply on changes in voter behavior. 
 
The Brazilian NGO sector  
 The Brazilian NGO sector has a long history of working within civil society to mobilize 
citizen participation and political change (ABONG, 2010; Fernandes & Carneiro, 1995; Landim, 
2008). Born out of heavy repression during the Brazilian military dictatorship between 1964 and 
1985, the Brazilian NGO sector is the direct descendant of the church, grassroots organizations, 
and community-led organizations that worked underground to support the radical opposition 
forces during that time. Originally inspired by the ideologies of liberation theology, Marxism, 
and Freire’s popular education movement, these social change-oriented organizations played a 
role in the re-democratization process after the abertura (political “opening”) in 1985, aligning 
themselves as political actors and representatives of the Brazilian public (Landim, 2008). Many 
of these community and social organizations had strong international ties due to their 
connections with formerly exiled Brazilian academics, political thinkers, and philosophers, 
including Paulo Freire. These intellectuals, who had spent significant time outside of Brazil 
during the dictatorship, often supported these non-profit outfits—with the assistance of foreign 
donors—upon returning to Brazil after abertura. The growth of community organizations as 
legitimate political actors offered new forms of political representation for marginalized peoples 
in a newly democratizing society. For example, these organizations helped once politically 
voiceless peoples accumulate political legitimacy by providing advising, funding, and general 
support for newly organized identity-based movements, as well as for trade union mobilizations 
and policy-related initiatives especially as the government underwent decentralization (Landim, 
2008). As organized bodies, these organizations became valid political actors whose intentions 
were considered “desirable, proper or appropriate” within the institutionalized local social 
structures (Scott, 2008, p. 59). 
 As this system of political decentralization unfolded, the newly democratic political 
regime moved a number of policy decision-making processes to the local level. Initiated by the 
Brazilian Constitution of 1988, decentralization increased public involvement in these 
procedures through the implementation of “participatory associations” that deliberately managed 
local and national policy initiatives related to social assistance, housing, education, women’s 
issues, environmental issues, care for the elderly, and indigenous and racial political issues 
(Landim, 2008). NGOs played a major role in fostering the development of these associations 
(Landim, 2008). Over time, the creation of this system solidified the bonds between NGOs, their 
donors, and various marginalized groups in Brazilian society, promoting the idea that through 
working together, they could achieve empowering changes in the political structure. This belief 
in the NGO sector’s power to build social capital within civil society and to serve as a valid 
representative of the public was perhaps best reinforced by the tremendous 1990s World Bank 
and government partnership to fund the growth of CSOs and the NGO sector in Rondônia, 
Brazil.  
 
PLANAFLORO 
 In the mid 1990s, the World Bank in partnership with the Brazilian government initiated 
a program to provide a rapid and substantial influx in funding to support the growth of the NGO 
sector in the state of Rondônia. The program, known as PLANAFLORO, was intended to 
mitigate some of the harsh environmental and political damages the state had previously faced by 
empowering citizens through working with participatory NGO programs and forming politically 
active CSOs (World Bank, n.d.). Prior to this initiative, there had been only a small NGO 
presence in this state. This state-wide effort to bolster the expansion of the NGO sector in 
Rondônia would thus contribute to an opening of 
social space in which people could interact, generate 
trust, construct collective identities, build the 
collective bargaining skills and develop the 
‘horizontal linkages’ within society that help 
democracy thrive. Without building such ‘horizontal 
linkages’, some argue that “politics is characterized 
by patronage, clientelism, and corruption” (Brown 
et al., 2008, p. 28)  
 Like much of western Brazil, Rondônia is 
covered with delicate, pristine rainforests and is 
home to Amerindians, rubber tappers, and landless 
workers who have been traditionally marginalized 
from majority Brazilian society. While the people 
living there had traditionally survived on 
subsistence livelihoods, harsh and exploitative 
development policies brought to the area in the late 1970s and 1980s decimated the local ecology 
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and threatened the ways of lives for many disempowered citizens (Lemos & Roberts, 2008). 
Projects like the government’s forced colonization program of the 1970s and the World Bank’s 
notoriously failed 1980s POLONORESTE development effort to construct a superhighway 
through the Amazon, eventually depleted almost a quarter of the state’s rainforest by the late 
1980s (World Bank, n.d.). These policies and the destruction that ensued led to the rapid in-
migration of ranchers, loggers and slash and burn farmers into the newly cleared area, 
endangering the livelihoods of over 100,000 people living in the region (Lemos & Roberts, 2008; 
World Bank, n.d.). In response to this development crisis, the World Bank reoriented its 
approach to development and natural resource management in Rondônia, crafting the 
PLANAFLORO project in 1994. This project was intended to mitigate some of the health 
degradation, poverty, land rights violations, educational issues, and environmental destruction 
wrought by prior destructive policies by increasing the local NGO presence in the state and by 
proposing that these NGOs operated  in a more participatory and inclusive manner (Lemos & 
Roberts, 2008; World Bank, n.d.). By inviting Brazilian professors, local agricultural workers 
and other rural groups to participate in strengthening grassroots coalitions, the World Bank’s 
PLANAFLORO project sought to mobilize greater citizen participation in local governance and 
resource management via a stronger, more participatory NGO sector (World Bank, n.d.).  
 While the PLANAFLORO initiative is generally referred to as a World Bank 
development project, it functioned in coordination with the Brazilian government. The Bank was 
the major contributor to the program, funding approximately USD 167 million, while the 
Brazilian government contributed the remaining USD 61.9 million (World Bank, n.d.).iii While 
the total amount of funds granted to PLANAFLORO was a significant decrease compared to the 
USD 1.6 billion allocated by the Bank in the 1980s to fund POLONOROESTE, this new project 
channeled funding specifically to NGOs as a means of supporting more sustainable local 
development and resource management. These funds, which did not have to be paid backiv, were 
distributed directly to NGOs in the form of grants for which NGOs first had to apply. Non-
governmental organizations under the PLANAFLORO initiative were to use these grants as start-
up capital, for organizational growth, and to support the organization of CSOs—like workers´ 
unions and other participatory associations aimed at mobilizing local communities to participate 
in the decision-making processes of the newly decentralized government (Brown et al., 2007, 
2008).   
 While some authors, including the World Bank’s own program evaluators, question the 
extent to which PLANAFLORO was able to accomplish this goal of social mobilization for 
political action and resource management (Lemos & Roberts, 2008; World Bank, n.d.), a series 
of studies conducted between 2002 and 2007 by David S. Brown, J. Christopher Brown, and 
Scott W. Desposato lend support to the World Bank’s overall analysis of the PLANAFLORO 
project. These studies concluded that increases in NGO resources did indeed usher in a new 
political current and “empower[ed] new forms of political participation” in Rondônia (Brown et 
al., 2007, p. 135). Even if the World Bank program evaluation was critical of its own 
participatory mobilization techniques, civil society was nonetheless successfully mobilized to 
create political change as a result of the increased associational opportunities made available by a 
growing NGO presence in the state. In the following section, I provide an overview of Brown, 
Brown, and Desposato’s conclusions regarding the role of PLANAFLORO in politically 
empowering civil society so that (1) the case may be more critically evaluated and (2) the 
development community can build a better understanding of the relationship between NGO 
funding and political empowerment. 
 
PLANAFLORO as associational activity  
 The years between 1994 and 1998 presented Brown, Brown, and Desposato (2002, 2007, 
2008) with an almost ideal historical scenario for analyzing the influence of NGO activity upon 
political change in Brazil. Between those years, the PLANAFLORO project was put into full 
swing in Rondônia as the World Bank rapidly increased the amount of development funds it was 
allocating to the NGO sector in the area (Brown et al., 2007; World Bank, n.d.). These years also 
happened to be the years between two national elections in which the same two candidates, Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, were the front-runners for president. 
Given this history, the authors built a statistical model to test for a relationship between the 
increases in NGO activity in the state and political changes occurring within civil society. The 
authors believed this relationship would symbolize collective grassroots mobilization that 
resulted from increased public associational activities (Brown et al., 2007).  
 At the time, Rondônia had long been recognized as a conservative state mired in 
corruption and an institutionalized patronage-based political system. Concurrently, the World 
Bank had begun to fuel the growth of the NGO sector as a democratizing force in the 1990s. 
Programs like PLANAFLORO funneled monies to local NGOs to support the construction of 
participatory CSOs (like farmer cooperatives or other labor organizations) with the hope of 
empowering local stakeholders (World Bank, n.d). These organizations used these funds to 
provide benefits (like farming subsidies) to individuals and were strengthened as more 
individuals joined (Brown et al., 2007). According to the logic of associational activity, as more 
individuals joined, these groups became better able to establish new collective norms and 
practices, thus influencing collective action in ways that are beneficial to group members (Scott, 
2008). Since voting was compulsory for adult Brazilians, Brown and his colleagues (2002, 2007) 
posited that if voter preferences changed dramatically in Rondônia between 1994 and 1998, then 
they could conclude that citizens had been successfully “mobilized” to support new candidates or 
to vote in unprecedented ways due to new norms and practices established through new 
associational activities.v For the authors, increased associational influence on collective action 
dramatically affected voting patterns at the national level, supporting the logic of the World 
Bank that increased participatory NGO activity affects the political participation of communities. 
However, limited change in voting patterns in local elections suggests that a more critical 
examination of participatory processes must be accounted for in order to glean better insight into 
the capacity of NGOs to empower the local citizenry.  
 
Aid allocation matters, too 
 Brown, Brown and Desposato’s (2007, 2008) findings confirmed their hypothesis that 
associational activity has a significant influence on voting patterns. More specifically, the 
authors believed that increased support for NGO activity would create opportunities for 
“horizontal linkages” to flourish within civil society, strengthening the bonds of both 
associational activity and collective dissent and ultimately leading to a shift in voter preferences. 
Brown et al. (2007, 2008) found a strong positive correlation between the amount of money 
allocated to the NGO sector in a given municipality and the shift in voter preferences to support 
the leftist presidential candidate. The difference was quite large—almost 20 percentage points 
between those communities that received the most PLANAFLORO funding to support NGO 
growth and those communities that received the least PLANAFLORO funding. Municipalities 
that received no PLANAFLORO funding between the two elections actually voted more 
conservatively in 1998, with the left vote dropping by about 5% in the second election. In the 
municipalities that received the most PLANAFLORO funding, the left vote increased by about 
13%. According to Brown and his colleagues (2007), voters in the well-funded municipalities 
were suddenly expressing and acting upon decidedly less conservative political preferences, a 
change attributable to the democratizing effect of associational activity embedded in 
participatory NGO work (Boulding, 2008; Brown et al., 2007, 2008; Kamat, 2004).  
 At the local level, however, Brown and his colleagues observed the opposite trends in the 
gubernatorial elections compared to voting trends observed in the presidential elections. While 
leftist gubernatorial candidates in Rondônia did worse overall from 1994 to 1998, they lost the 
most votes in those municipalities that received the most PLANAFLORO funding (Brown et al., 
2007). Brown and his colleagues attributed this maintenance of the conservative status-quo in 
these areas to the fact that the project funds were allocated at the municipal levels to governors 
who had control over when the funds would be released to local NGOs. While the governors did 
not actually have the ability to increase the funds and were not themselves responsible for 
bringing funding to CSOs in the area, the governors appeared in the eyes of voters to be 
responsible for the new programs offered by NGOs (Boulding & Gibson, 2008; Brown et al., 
2007, 2008). This led to the increased support of incumbent, conservative governors by voters 
who simultaneously supported the more left-leaning presidential candidate.  
 Together, these mixed results reveal how administrative factors concerning the allocation 
of project funding can become a key factor in determining the political effect of a project. In this 
case, the local incumbents seem to have benefited enormously from the ability to control the 
timing of aid distribution. Similarly, incumbents could have withheld funds if citizens, NGOs, or 
other CSOs mobilized in ways that did not align with their political agendas. While the observed 
changes in voting patterns may suggest that on some level the NGOs in Rondônia were capable 
of building associative activity, encouraging “horizontal linkages and produc[ing] social capital 
that, in turn…foster[ed] alternative political ideas” (Boulding & Gibson, 2008), this broader 
question regarding the political effects of funding distribution raises doubt about the overall 
capacity of large-scale development projects like PLANAFLORO to empower civil society, 
despite their emphasis on employing participatory programs via local NGOs.  
Voting, and participation: A critique  
 From a critical theory perspective, one cannot help but argue that efforts to create real 
political change on behalf of marginalized communities entail more than half-hearted efforts to 
involve them in voting for government representatives. Instead, political change requires that the 
inequalities entrenched within social structures be recognized and dealt with intentionally 
through participatory programming (Cervero, 2006; Forester, 1989; Freire, 1974). The option to 
choose between two pre-selected political platforms in an election is not the same as 
problematizing and acting on the issues that affect people’s livelihoods and marginalized statuses 
on a daily basis. While breeding horizontal linkages in society such as collective identities and 
increased communal trust can strengthen the associational activities of CSOs and produce 
changes in electoral results, this does not equate to an increase in the political agencyvi of civil 
society. Changes in voting preferences alone do not necessarily mean that more people are 
empowered to have a voice in the laws, policies, and norms that govern their everyday lives. 
While Brown and his colleagues (2002, 2007, 2008) present a compelling case for the power of 
associational activities to sway elections, they only briefly recognize the power structures 
embedded in the discourse of development and the political constraints of working within 
internationally funded structures. Oftentimes, emphasis on power structures are excluded from 
analyses like Brown et al.’s due to the fact that socio-political relations are difficult to identify 
clearly and measure quantitatively. Researchers working with econometric and statistical 
regression models often face difficulties in accounting for such social complexities. In this same 
light, program planners in the development community often struggle to account for the power 
structures embedded in their work as they are difficult to monitor and manage administratively 
(Ebrahim, 2003; Fischer, 2000; Kamat, 2004). As NGOs and the rest of the development 
community have come to embrace a more participatory rhetoric, the idea of participation has 
evolved into something far different from its critical roots as the idea has been adapted to 
something more easily managed and monitored by program donors and evaluators.  
 While the World Bank did not begin implementing participatory programs in Brazil until 
the early 1990s, participatory development practices were initiated in the 1980s as both a 
response to top-down planning and development strategies and as a product of new civic-
engagement alternatives emerging out of the 1970s dependency theory movement  (Ebrahim, 
2003). Initially advanced much earlier by thinkers like Freire, critical participatory methodology 
is a slow and tedious process which facilitates empowerment via “the creation of institutional 
and intellectual conditions that help people pose questions in their own ordinary (or everyday) 
languages and decide issues important to them” (Fischer, 2000, p. 184). A humbler 
understanding of the capacity of NGOs to empower civil society through participatory 
engagement is important here; ‘local participation’ is a term used commonly in development 
today, but it has become quite decoupled in practice from its essential meaning. Many of today’s 
‘participatory’ programs “have moved away from education and empowerment programs that 
involve structural analysis of power and inequality” and have instead turned to technical projects, 
emphasizing managerial-style, solution-based approaches for addressing issues of poverty and 
oppression (Kamat, 2004, p. 168). The “mainstreaming” of these “radical and transformative” 
methodologies (Wallace et al., 2007, p. 21) results in their conversion to de-politicized 
approaches, essentially robbing them of their empowering character and diminishing the space 
within which citizens can genuinely participate and become more politically empowered. A loss 
of local problematization processes—which are the foundations of Freirean critical pedagogy 
and other critical program planning perspectives (Cervero, 2006; Fischer, 2000; Forester, 
1989)—jeopardizes the capacity to mobilize the agency of civil society. 
 Though the PLANAFLORO project was intended to be participatory and to engage local 
citizens, the Bank concludes in its program evaluation that the participatory measures used to 
engage citizens in policy making failed to function effectively in practice (World Bank, n.d.). 
Initially geared to “[c]ontribute to the social and political organization of rural communities and 
traditional peoples [to] stimulate the process of democratization for the exercise of citizenship” 
in Rondônia (Brown et al., 2007, p. 128), local government representatives were resistant to the 
participation of CSOs in local decision-making dialogue (World Bank, n.d.). Oftentimes, 
government officials were absent from community meetings, which were meant to include 
stakeholders from both the government and civil society in decision-making processes. Meetings 
that included stakeholders from various social groups were not always productive because the 
language of communication (including the high usage of technical jargon) hindered participation 
by constituents. Citizens were often viewed as “partisan” or too “technically weak to participate 
in complex development projects,” making government officials reluctant to work with the 
participatory organizations that NGOs had organized (World Bank, n.d.). Furthermore, working 
together was difficult for those who had little experience or training in participatory 
methodologies, as the concepts of ‘problematizing’ and ‘facilitating of empowerment’ were 
unfamiliar to those local leaders in charge of programming (Fischer, 2000; World Bank, n.d.). 
Moreover, the World Bank assessment noted that the state of Rondônia had been historically run 
by elites and had a political system that functioned via political clientelism. The involvement of 
civil society in decision-making processes thus threatened to upset institutionalized oligarchic 
power structures. As a result, local leaders were de-incentivized from being inclusive of local 
citizens groups, causing PLANAFLORO great difficulty in enacting critical participatory 
projects.  
 Perhaps the greatest indication that the PLANAFLORO project diverged from critical 
participatory methodologies is the fact that the goals of the project were not defined by members 
of the local community to begin with. Instead, the program came equipped with four major 
themes that happened to align with overseas donors and the Brazilian government’s interests 
(World Bank, n.d.). To some extent this divergence may indicate a lack of experience or training 
in managing participatory experiences—a shortcoming which the World Bank evaluation itself 
acknowledges—or to the inherent difficulties in translating such a non-hierarchical and fluid 
participatory discourse into the language of controllable projects which by nature must be 
manageable, clearly defined, generally quantifiable, and are often severely limited by both time 
and budget (Cleaver, 1999).  
Conclusion 
 Overall, the PLANAFLORO project calls to attention the ways in which foreign funded 
participatory NGO programs may influence political affairs within a country but are still unable 
to facilitate transformations of power relations at the local level. This calls into question the 
capacity of the NGO sector to organize and mobilize civil society and, most importantly, the 
relationship between foreign development aid and local empowerment. As the international 
development community continues to pursue its course of funding participatory programs and 
relying heavily on NGOs to act as agents of change in civil society, a more critical view of these 
processes needs to be developed in order to more fully account for the political implications of 
such aid allocation structures and its effect on marginalized communities. Until this happens, 
international development efforts may offer few opportunities to politically empower local 
communities, whether their programs are participatory in nature or not.  
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i Critical perspective here refers to the camp of theory based heavily on a Marxist tradition. This perspective has 
evolved over time and across the social sciences, but is primarily concerned with the liberation of human beings 
from the socio-political and economic inequalities that oppress them. For a comprehensive overview of a number of 
critical perspectives, see The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/) 
ii See works like Wallace, Bornstein and Chapman’s (2007) The aid chain, coercion and commitment in development 
NGOs for more insight into this perspective as well as critiques of the democratic capacities of NGOs which have 
evolved over the past decade. 
iii This is a massive amount of money allotted for a single project in a single state, especially when compared to the 
total amount of USAID assistance given to the entire country of Brazil in 2010: USD 22.5 million 
(http://brazil.usaid.gov/).  
iv Neither the World Bank (n.d.) nor Brown and colleagues (2007, 2008) address how it came to be that these 
“loans” from the World Bank were granted with no strings attached. This is a far cry from the Bank’s typical loan 
procedures in the late 1980s and early 1990s. One possible explanation for this inconsistency is that PLANAFLORO 
implementers were aware of the growing criticism of this loan scheme and the growing pressure from other 
international donors and country leadership advocating the removal of debt repayment obligations on funds given to 
Brazil for sustainable development initiatives in the Amazonia region (Brooke, 1989).  
v Brown et al. (2002, 2008)also base much of their logic on the works of Robert Putnam’s interpretation of 
associational theory and social capital, which attributes better functioning democracies to increases in civic 
engagement. For a brief overview, see http://www.infed.org/thinkers/putnam.htm. 
vi I use the term agency here to mean the ability of individuals or social groups to understand, control, and change 
the way they act and interact within social structures (e.g. the “rules and resources” which are allocated within 
society and upheld by social institutions) (Giddens, 1979). 
 
 
